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The Unappreciated Congruity of
the Second and Third Torts
Restatements on Design Defects
Michael D. Green†
I.

INTRODUCTION

Teaching products liability for the first time in 1980, I was
baffled at how the California Supreme Court could have refused to
provide more elaboration on the concept of defect.1 While its resistance
to adopting the Restatement (Second)’s “defective condition
unreasonably dangerous”2 language was understandable, even perhaps
preferable, how could the court not have appreciated that the idea of a
“defect” required elaboration in order for the fact finder to determine
whether a product was sufficiently safe? Of course, eventually the
California Supreme Court saw the light. In Barker v. Lull Engineering
Co., it relented on its refusal to provide further specification for the
concept of defect and provided a two-pronged test for determining if a
product was defective in design.3
I think now I understand the court’s reluctance to provide more,
reflected in its early post-section 402A products liability jurisprudence. I
also appreciate now why I failed to comprehend the court’s reticence.
And the explanation for that appreciation sheds light on the Restatement
(Third)4 and its treatment of design defects, a matter that has generated
much controversy and significant criticism. That is the subject that I
would like to pursue in this symposium’s reflection on the tenth
anniversary of the Products Liability Restatement.

†

Williams Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law. The author thanks
Brandon Barnes and Meredith Green for their diligent research assistance. The author is also
indebted to Oscar Gray, who explained a central point in this Article in a taxicab in Philadelphia
after an Advisers meeting for the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability. I am grateful as
well for helpful comments at a faculty colloquium at Washington University School of Law and
students in Professor Kim Norwood’s products liability class at Washington University.
1
Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1162-63 (Cal. 1972).
2
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
3
573 P.2d 443, 455-56 (Cal. 1978).
4
I refer to the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability alternatively as either
Restatement (Third) or Products Liability Restatement in this Article. By contrast, I use Restatement
(Third) of Torts to refer to the compendium of individual pieces, including the Products Liability
Restatement, that will comprise the entirety of the third iteration of the torts Restatement.
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This Article is not intended as an all-encompassing defense of
the Restatement (Third)’s treatment of design defects.5 Rather its goal is
more modest. What I hope to demonstrate, contrary to contending critics
of the Restatement (Third), is the congruity between the law adopted in
the Restatement (Third) and the law in the Restatement (Second). To do
that, though, I will have to spend more time than I would have thought
when I began this Article on the scope of the Restatement (Second) with
regard to manufacturing defects and design defects.
I begin in Part II of this Article by setting forth contending and
conflicting claims about the scope of section 402A and its treatment of
design defects. While one of those claims was made twenty years ago,
well before the Restatement (Third) process began, it contends that
section 402A was not about design defects. The conflicting claim, one
raised vociferously during the drafting of the Restatement (Third), is that
it fails to continue the strict liability reform of section 402A by
abandoning consumer expectations as the basis for a design defect. Part
III delves into the former claim, by Professor George Priest, that section
402A was meant to apply only to manufacturing defects, leaving alleged
design and warnings defects to be decided under a negligence standard. I
reanalyze the evidence that Professor Priest amassed in support of his
claim, both in the scholarship leading up to the adoption and approval of
section 402A and in the structure of that section and its comments.
Having found Priest’s claim wanting, Part IV proceeds to explain the
consistency of the Restatement (Second) and Restatement (Third) in their
treatment of design defects, a consistency that escapes critics on both
sides of the claims identified in Part II.
II.

THE CRITIQUE OF DESIGN DEFECTS IN THE PRODUCTS
LIABILITY RESTATEMENT

I do not attempt to address all of the criticism of the Products
Liability Restatement’s treatment of design defects, but there are two
competing themes that I pursue. One was first raised by George Priest,
before we even knew that Products Liability would be the first piece of
the Restatement (Third) of Torts. In 1989, Priest claimed that courts had
strayed from what the founders intended and from what section 402A

5

For example, one might reasonably have thought that the design defect standard in
section 2(b) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability could have been more
transparent about adopting a risk-utility standard. One might also have preferred placing the burden
of proof on the foreseeability of risk on the defendant, on the grounds that it almost always exists in
the case of durable goods. Actually, comment m to section 2 comes close to adopting such a
placement in the burden of proof, despite black letter language that ignores the matter. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. m (1998). And for those committed to
compensation and loss spreading, there is no doubt that the Restatement (Third) represents a retreat
from the apogee of the strict liability movement when courts struggled to define a regime for strict
liability different from the reasonableness-balancing of negligence.
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was intended to address.6 According to Priest, section 402A was limited
to manufacturing defects and in extending strict liability beyond those
kinds of defects to include design and warnings, courts had strayed from
the original intent.7 Priest’s claim has more widespread contemporary
acceptance than I had appreciated. At the symposium where the papers in
this issue of the Brooklyn Law Review were presented, both Aaron
Twerski and Hildy Bowbeer, the former a co-Reporter for the Products
Liability Restatement and the latter a prominent products liability lawyer,
repeated the claim that section 402A was meant to apply only to
manufacturing defects. Professor Twerski has since disavowed that
claim.8 In Priest’s view, design and warnings issues were to be left to

6

See George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 10 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2301, 2301-05 (1989).
7
Id. at 2303-04.
8
See Aaron D. Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturers’ Liability for
Defective Product Designs: The Triumph of Risk Utility, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1061 (2009). Scholars
who have been misled by Priest’s claim over the years since his article was published include:
Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for Enterprise
Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683, 702 n.80 (1993); Larry E. Ribstein, The Mandatory Nature of the
ALI Code, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 984, 1016 n.173 (1993); Paul H. Rubin & Martin J. Bailey, The
Role of Lawyers in Changing the Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 807, 808 (1994); Peter L. Strauss, Courts
or Tribunals? Federal Courts and the Common Law, 53 ALA. L. REV. 891, 920 (2002); Peter Nash
Swisher, Products Liability Tort Reform: Why Virginia Should Adopt the Henderson-Twerski
Proposed Revision of Section 402A, Restatement (Second) of Torts, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 857, 863
n.28 (1993) (stating that the “authors of section 402A primarily focused” on manufacturing defects);
Michael J. Tõke, Note, Categorical Liability for Manifestly Unreasonable Designs: Why the
Comment d Caveat Should Be Removed from the Restatement (Third), 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1181,
1190 & n.48 (1996) (Section 402A “was intended to apply only to latent manufacturing defects.”);
see also JANE STAPLETON, PRODUCT LIABILITY 25 & n.66 (1994) (citing Priest for the proposition
that “the historical record suggests that the principal aim . . . was merely to make uniform and
explicit the strict standard for manufacturing errors”); Mary J. Davis, Design Defect Liability: In
Search of a Standard of Responsibility, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1217, 1233 & n.50 (1993) (“Professor
Priest argues persuasively that the mismanufactured product constituted the intended reach of strict
liability under section 402A.”); Victor E. Schwartz & Rochelle M. Tedesco, The Re-emergence of
“Super Strict” Liability: Slaying the Dragon Again, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 917, 923-24 & n.50 (2003)
(lawyers who represent defendants’ interests stating that “several scholars” agree that section 402A
is limited to manufacturing defects and citing Priest for that proposition). The American Law
Institute’s Reporters’ Study also belongs on this list. See 2 AM. LAW INST., REPORTERS’ STUDY ON
ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 35 & n.7 (1991) (noting that “the law explicitly
authorized actions based on defects in manufacture”).
Douglas Kysar claims that the consumer expectations test in section 402A was not
intended to address design defect litigation and cites Priest in support. See Douglas A. Kysar, The
Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700, 1713 & n.53 (2003). I do not disagree with
Kysar on that point, although his suggestion that all of the product failure cases were manufacturing
defect cases is not supportable. See id. at 1714. By contrast, Richard Wright asserts that section
402A “clearly was meant to encompass design and warning defects,” which is a tad misleading
given the lack of attention by the founders to the source of the defect, a matter that Wright
acknowledges and appreciates. See Richard W. Wright, The Principles of Product Liability, 26 REV.
LITIG. 1067, 1068-69 (2007).
Rick Cupp and Bob Rabin share my view that the founders and early courts were
simply not thinking in terms of specific kinds of defects. See Richard L. Cupp Jr. & Danielle Polage,
The Rhetoric of Strict Products Liability Versus Negligence: An Empirical Analysis, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 874, 889-90 (2002); Robert L. Rabin, Restating the Law: The Dilemmas of Products Liability,
30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 197, 202-03 (1997); see also Gary T. Schwartz, Considering the Proper
Federal Role in American Tort Law, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 917, 947 & n.185 (1996).
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negligence.9 While Priest was not speaking to the next-generation
Restatement, the implications of his critique would be an important
consideration for any effort to draft the next Restatement treatment of
products liability.
The second critique is of the design defect standard in section
2(b) of the Restatement (Third). That subsection mandates that a
reasonable alternative design be demonstrated in order to prove a design
defect exists.10 Once the plaintiff identifies an alternative design, the jury
must compare the additional risks that the alternative design can
eliminate from the existing design with the additional costs entailed in
adopting the alternative design. This risk-utility standard is, frankly, one
that reflects a negligence balancing.
Although many commentators have raised criticisms about the
Restatement (Third)’s treatment of design defects, I focus here on those
that decry the Restatement (Third) for abandoning the strict liability
adopted in section 402A and its use of consumer expectations as the
basis for determining defectiveness. Ellen Wertheimer, a products
liability scholar, has written extensively on the failed promise of the
Restatement (Second) in the provisions of the Restatement (Third).11 She
has argued that requiring proof of a reasonable alternative design and
that the existing design fails a risk-utility test12 materially changes the
standard for strict liability set out in the Restatement (Second).13
Similarly, Frank Vandall has charged that the reasonable alternative
design requirement violates the core of what section 402A was about,14
especially cases like Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.15
Frequently, these critics have also asserted that the Reporters for the
Restatement (Third) failed to follow the design defect jurisprudence that
developed after widespread acceptance of strict products liability, which

9

See Priest, supra note 6, at 2303.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998).
11
See infra note 13.
12
Contrary to the implications of what Wertheimer wrote, these are not two independent
requirements. One cannot assess risk-utility for a given design without an alternative design by
which to frame the risk-utility analysis. See Michael D. Green, The Schizophrenia of Risk-Benefit
Analysis in Design Defect Litigation, 48 VAND. L. REV. 609, 616-17 (1995).
13
See Ellen Wertheimer, The Third Restatement of Torts: An Unreasonably Dangerous
Doctrine, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1235, 1251-52, 1255 (1994); see also Ellen Wertheimer, The
Smoke Gets in Their Eyes: Product Category Liability and Alternative Feasible Designs in the Third
Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1429, 1431-32 (1994) (“The Restatement (Third), however,
materially increases the plaintiff’s burden by requiring that the plaintiff show not only that the
product fails a risk-utility test, but also that an alternative feasible design existed at the time of
manufacture and that the manufacturer should have used that alternative design.”).
14
See Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section
2(b): The Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1407, 1407, 1423 (1994)
(stating that the Restatement (Third) proposes a “radical restructuring” of existing products liability
theory).
15
377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
10
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has not, for the most part, insisted on proof of a reasonable alternative
design.16
Rather than engage now with this strain of criticism, I return to
the conflicting Priest position. If Professor Priest is right, then criticism
of the Restatement (Third) for adopting a negligence standard for design
defects at least should appreciate that the Restatement (Third) remains
true to the original reform exemplified in section 402A. Indeed, one
might say that the Restatement (Third) returns us from a frolic and detour
in which many courts engaged in the years after section 402A. During
this period, courts struggled to find a form of “strict liability” to impose
on products that was different from the extant negligence regime that
operated before section 402A was adopted. If Priest’s hypothesis that
section 402A limited strict liability to manufacturing defects is correct,
then employing consumer expectations to determine how safe a product
should be made, imputing knowledge of dangers that were unknown at
the time of manufacture and sale, and similar steps were mistaken efforts
that went beyond the more modest intentions of section 402A. In
addition, the Restatement (Third) strays from its predecessor in
permitting an inference of defect from the circumstances surrounding the
product’s performance regardless of whether the source of the defect is
one of design or manufacture.17
III.

THE PRIEST HYPOTHESIS

Professor Priest relies on two sources of evidence in support of
his theory that section 402A was intended to be limited to manufacturing
defects. The first is the academic literature leading up to the adoption of
section 402A, which was published by Prosser, the Reporter for the
Restatement (Second),18 the Advisers for the Restatement (Second) of
16

See Roland F. Banks & Margaret O’Connor, Commentary, Restating the Restatement
(Second), Section 402A—Design Defect, 72 OR. L. REV. 411, 412 (1993) (observing that the
“definition of design defect” in the Restatement (Third) is a “substantial change” from section 402A
of the Restatement (Second)); John F. Vargo, Caveat Emptor: Will the A.L.I. Erode Strict Liability in
the Restatement (Third) for Products Liability?, 10 TOURO L. REV. 21, 21 n.1, 22 n.2, 37-38 (1993)
(noting that the Restatement (Third) substitutes negligence for strict liability of Restatement
(Second)); Note, Just What You’d Expect: Professor Henderson’s Redesign of Products Liability,
111 HARV. L. REV. 2366, 2368 (1998); Patrick Lavelle, Comment, Crashing into Proof of a
Reasonable Alternative Design: The Fallacy of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability,
38 DUQ. L. REV. 1059, 1064-67, 1100-01 (2000) (accusing products liability Restatement of
partisanship in favoring defendants and turning its back on the strict liability rules and policies
contained in section 402A); Matthew R. Sorenson, Comment, A Reasonable Alternative? Should
Wyoming Adopt the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?, 3 WYO. L. REV. 257, 283
(2003) (“By . . . requiring the plaintiff to prove a reasonable alternative design, the Restatement
(Third) moved far from the strict liability standard set out in Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second).”).
17
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3 (1998).
18
Prosser subsequently resigned as Reporter shortly before his death, and John Wade
took over Reporter duties. Prosser was the Reporter at the time that section 402A was proposed and
approved. See Herbert W. Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402 and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. REV. 713, 713 (1970).
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Torts, and a small group of fellow travelers who were writing about
products liability in the 1950s and early 1960s.19 The second source of
evidence is the structure of section 402A and its commentary, which
reflect, on Priest’s account, an assumption that the strict liability being
described is limited to manufacturing defects (even if that terminology
was not employed at the time).
A.

The Founders’ Views

I understand Priest’s claim to be about the intent of the founders
with regard to section 402A and not what the state of the law was in
1964 when section 402A was approved. As is well-known, section 402A
was not a “restatement” of existing law. Rather, it reflected
dissatisfaction with the existing state of the law that posed so many
obstacles to establishing liability for dangerous products that caused
harm. Prosser and the other founders conceived of section 402A as a
means to transport the strict liability of implied warranty into tort law,
stripping warranty of its contract impediments in the process. Relying on
the slim foundation of contaminated food and riding the wave of a couple
of late-breaking cases, Prosser forged section 402A as a progressive
reform rather than a statement of existing law.20 Thus, the evidence
relevant to Priest’s hypothesis is the normative positions of the
founders—not their descriptive accounts of existing law.
Let me provide a contending theory of what was behind section
402A before proceeding to critique the Priest hypothesis. The strict
liability proposed by section 402A was not limited to manufacturing
defects. Indeed, that section, influenced by its warranty heritage—the
then-existing source of strict liability in the law—employed a conceptual
framework independent of specific types of defect.21 Rather than the
familiar three-defect world in which we find ourselves today, section
402A contemplated a performance-based idea for defect. If a product
performed in a way that revealed a defect—regardless of its source—
then it was defective. Thus, if a gun went off when being held by its
owner without the owner engaging its trigger, the gun was defective and
we need not trace the source of that defect. It is this alternative to the
Priest manufacturing-defect theory that better accounts, in my view, for
the evidence relating to what was intended in section 402A.
19

In addition to William Prosser, these commentators, all academics save for Justice
Roger Traynor, include Dix Noel, Page Keeton, Fleming James, John Wade, and Traynor. These
were all leading torts commentators in the middle of the twentieth century.
20
See, e.g., Titus, supra note 18, at 713-15; see also George L. Priest, The Invention of
Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 461, 514-17 (1985) (criticizing Reporter Prosser for his exaggeration in extending his
draft of section 402A to all products).
21
See Cupp & Polage, supra note 8, at 889-90; Rabin, supra note 8, at 202-03; Schwartz,
supra note 8, at 947 & n.185.
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Before proceeding, let me point out one aspect of agreement
between my explanation and Priest’s. Section 402A was not about
employing strict liability to determine how safe a product should be
designed, the modern version of design defect litigation that emerged
after courts accepted section 402A. I should explain that we can virtually
always design a durable good to be marginally safer. A guard can be
added to the pinch point of an industrial machine. If the guard is
removable for maintenance purposes, then an interlock could be added to
prevent use of the machine without the guard. We could extend this
safety-for-cost tradeoff to extremes: cars, for example, could be designed
like tanks and thereby eliminate almost all of the 40,000 traffic-related
deaths and over two million personal injuries suffered each year by those
riding on the nation’s highways.22 Nobody thought that section 402A
would provide the metric for deciding how much safety should be built
into industrial machinery or automobiles. At the same time, I do not
think that section 402A was meant to be limited to manufacturing
defects.
Priest explains his theory that section 402A was to be so limited
and that negligence was to remain the regime for warnings and design
defect cases,23 writing:
[T]he founders did not fully appreciate the distinctions among manufacturing
defects, design defects, and defective warnings that would become the
centerpiece of modern law. Section 402A represented only a limited change in
the law because the founders intended the Section’s strict liability standard,
with minor exceptions, to apply only to what we now call manufacturing defect
cases.24

The first notable matter about Priest’s claim is the logical
inconsistency between the idea that the founders did not have a clear
grasp of the three different kinds of defects and the claim that they
intended to apply strict liability only to manufacturing defect cases. If the
founders did not clearly know what a manufacturing defect is—not a
difficult concept25—or the ways in which it is different from a design or
22

The data reflect the toll during the year 2007. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC AND
SAFETY ADMIN., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS, TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 1 (2008),
available at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/portal/nhtsa_static_file_downloader.jsp?file=/staticfiles/DOT/
NHTSA/NCSA/Content/RNotes/2008/811017.pdf.
23
See Priest, supra note 6, at 2303.
24
Id. at 2303; see also id. at 2308 (“The cases for which the founders believed
consumers deserved automatic recovery are what we now call manufacturing or production defect
cases in which the injury to the consumer was caused by a deviation from the manufacturer’s own
standards of production or quality control. We shall see in a moment that the Restatement and its
Comments make sole reference to manufacturing defect cases.”).
Priest does not return to or explain the “minor exceptions” to which he adverts in the
quoted language nor does he explain the discrepancy between the language quoted in the text and the
language quoted in the prior paragraph, which is not qualified with any “exceptions.”
25
The Restatement (Third) explains a manufacturing defect as one that occurs when the
product “departs from its intended design.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(a)
(1998). That definition is similar to one provided by Page Keeton in the academic literature
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informational defect, how could they have intended to limit strict liability
to a type of defect that they did not fully understand? A second aspect of
Priest’s claim that requires careful attention is the difference between a
type of defect—manufacturing defects—serving as the model for strict
liability and the idea that strict liability was limited to those kinds of
defects. There is no doubt, as explained below, that contaminated food
was the ballast on which strict products liability was developed. Whether
that means it was so limited to that kind of defect is a different question,
a distinction that Professor Priest tends to ignore.26
But there is not much to Priest’s claim that the founders did not
understand the idea of a design or warning defect—putting aside for the
moment whether they intended strict liability to apply to it.27 As Priest’s
own research revealed, academics of the day discussed liability for
negligent design, so they were cognizant of the notion that defects might
have different sources, including the manner in which products were
designed.28 Indeed, Dix Noel wrote an article, published in the Yale Law
Journal, that assessed manufacturers’ liability for design and warnings
defects.29 That article reveals a thriving trade in cases confronting the
question under negligence law of how safe a product should be designed.
The idea of liability for a manufacturer whose design is negligent is even
ensconced in a black letter section of the first Restatement of Torts.30 And
Prosser had already prepared a draft of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
that contained a similar provision.31 Dillard and Hart wrote an early
important article on inadequate warnings as the basis for a seller’s
liability.32 Others, who may not have used the term “manufacturing
defect,” nevertheless described the concept.33
preceding the adoption of section 402A: “The product was not in all respects as it was intended to be
or as the purchaser or user expected it to be.” Page Keeton, Products Liability—Liability Without
Fault and the Requirement of a Defect, 41 TEX. L. REV. 855, 859 (1963).
26
Thus, for example, Priest claims that Roger Traynor believed that strict liability in
section 402A was limited to manufacturing defects. Priest, supra note 6, at 2314. But his evidence
for that proposition is that Traynor was thinking about such defects when he wrote about strict
liability in a 1965 article. Id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 60-67.
27
Another error concerns Priest’s claim that “none of the founders at the time had
focused clearly on design problems as ‘defects,’” Priest, supra note 6, at 2315 n.60, yet John Wade
did exactly that in an article that Priest discusses. Id. at 2313 (“Wade believes that more difficult
problems [than with manufacturing defects] arise where the product . . . incorporates a dangerous
design.”).
28
Fleming James, Jr., Products Liability (pt.1), 34 TEX. L. REV. 44, 50 (1955).
29
Dix W. Noel, Manufacturer’s Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a
Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816, 816-17 (1962).
30
See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 398 (1934).
31
Section 398 in the Restatement (Second) broadened the first Restatement’s treatment
modestly by extending its protection to all who might be expected to be endangered by the product
instead of the first Restatement’s limitation to those expected to be “in the vicinity.” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 398 (Prelim. Draft No. 6, 1958).
32
Hardy Cross Dillard & Harris Hart, II, Product Liability: Directions for Use and the
Duty to Warn, 41 VA. L. REV. 145, 146-47 (1955).
33
See Keeton, supra note 25, at 859 (describing a situation where the “product was
different from products of like kind” and “[t]here was a miscarriage in the manufacturing process”).

2009]

CONGRUITY OF SECOND AND THIRD TORTS RESTATEMENTS

815

Yet, in a curious and oblique way, there is something to Priest’s
claim: one does not readily find references to the different types of
design defects in the Restatement or in the writings in the run-up to its
adoption. However, my interpretation of that evidence is that rather than
not appreciating these concepts, the Restatement and the founders did not
consider them to be of importance.
Thus, most of the normative academic attention of the day was
not about the standard for strict liability, as Priest explains.34 Instead,
most academics were concerned with the various impediments to
imposing liability—such as the privity barrier and other warranty law
limitations—rather than the substantive standard by which products
would be judged. Prosser, in his classic Assault Upon the Citadel article,
in which he was working out the scope of section 402A, spent a great
deal of time addressing which products and defendants would be subject
to strict liability, which plaintiffs could recover, and what defenses might
be available, but barely adverted to the standard by which defectiveness
would be determined.35
34

Priest, supra note 6, at 2305-08.
William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1110-11, 1114-20 (1960). By the time he first revised his torts treatise after the
publication of section 402A (and after cases had been decided on the matter), Prosser wrote that
section 402A applied as well to design defect cases. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS § 99, at 659 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter PROSSER, HANDBOOK (4th ed.)]. But
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963), one of the cases on which this
statement was based, was pre-section 402A. Friedrich Kessler, another academic observer—one who
Professor Priest credits as being among the three most influential scholars in the intellectual history
of strict products liability—remarked two years after section 402A was published that it applied not
only to manufacturing defects but to design defects as well as informational deficiencies. See
Friedrich Kessler, Products Liability, 76 YALE L.J. 887, 900 & n.71, 901 (1967); George L. Priest,
The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern
Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 492, 494-95 (1985). Priest does, however, explain that Kessler’s
concern was with shifting influence away from contract law rather than with the question of
defectiveness. See Priest, supra, at 493-94.
Professors Henderson and Twerski, in their effort to justify a risk-benefit standard for
design defects in the Restatement (Third), accept Priest’s characterization of Prosser and cite
Prosser’s discussion of negligent design in his 1971 treatise as support. See James A. Henderson, Jr.
& Aaron D. Twerski, Product Design Liability in Oregon and the New Restatement, 78 OR. L. REV.
1, 11 n.32, 24 & n.94 (1999) [hereinafter Henderson & Twerski, Product Design Liability in
Oregon]; James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Arriving at Reasonable Alternative Design:
The Reporters’ Travelogue, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 563, 569 & n.11, 572 & n.16 (1997)
[hereinafter Henderson & Twerski, Arriving at a Reasonable Alternative Design]. If they had limited
their claim to assert that Prosser did not address whether consumer expectations should be applied to
modern design defect litigation that raises the issue of how safe a product should be designed, I think
they would have been correct. However, they did not, instead asserting that Prosser “emphatically
rejects” use of consumer expectations for design defect cases. See Henderson & Twerski, Product
Design Liability in Oregon, supra, at 24. Prosser contributed to their reading of him with a slapdash
and inconsistent revision of the third edition of his treatise, which was written before the adoption of
section 402A, and the fourth edition, which was written after. Compare WILLIAM L. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 96, 99 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter PROSSER, HANDBOOK (3d
ed.)] with PROSSER, HANDBOOK (4th ed.), supra, §§ 96, 99. In the midst of the discussion of
negligent design carried forward from the third edition, Prosser inserted several paragraphs about
strict liability and added that “the tort is essentially a matter of negligence,” before proceeding to
explain the sort of balancing that would be relevant in a negligent design case. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
(4th ed.), supra, § 96, at 644-45. A dozen pages later, Prosser inserted a new section on “Strict
35
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To be sure, most of the cases Prosser cited and discussed
involved food contaminated with impurities.36 These are the edible
equivalent of manufacturing defects, containing an aspect that is not
intended by the preparer. Food was the first product subject to strict
liability, and those cases contributed much of the precedential fodder on
which Prosser and his fellow travelers relied. Yet nowhere does Prosser
identify these contaminated-food cases as ones involving manufacturing
defects or even as instances of deviation from the preparer’s intentions.
So, the fact that the predominant cases of the day were food and
involved impurities supports the idea that strict liability would include
manufacturing defects but it does not mean that other kinds of defects
were meant to be excluded. Page Keeton, the academic of the day who
seems to have thought most deeply and published the most about the
substance of what a defect might encompass, identified, in a 1963 article,
two classes of cases that might be subject to strict liability: 1) products
having an aspect unintended by and unknown to the manufacturer; and 2)
products that pose a danger because of essential characteristics of the
product.37 Priest claims that Keeton’s first category is manufacturing
defects, and the second category is not design defects, but a class of
cases that have come to be known as “unavoidably unsafe products,”38
rather than design defect cases.
Priest is surely right that the second category does not reflect
classic design defect cases. Yet it does involve defectiveness on a basis
other than a manufacturing defect: these products are made precisely in
the fashion intended by the manufacturer. Priest nevertheless finds
Keeton’s discussion supportive because, “according to Keeton, strict
liability is only appropriate for the first category of defects
(manufacturing defects).”39 Instead, says Priest, Keeton contemplated
that the second-category manufacturers would only be subject to liability
for negligence.40 This, then, would limit strict liability to the first
category, manufacturing defects. The problem with Priest’s claim is that
Keeton did not conclude that strict liability should be inapplicable to the
second category of products. Instead, he distinguished between socially
valuable products, such as prescription drugs, and others, such as
Liability in Tort,” that contains the assertion above that section 402A applies to design cases. See
PROSSER, HANDBOOK (4th ed.), supra, § 96, at 659. In contrast to their acceptance of Prosser’s
“emphatic rejection,” Professors Henderson and Twerski have acknowledged that section 402A was
not drafted to exclude non-manufacturing defects. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski,
Achieving Consensus on Defective Product Design, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 867, 879 (1998)
[hereinafter Henderson & Twerski, Achieving Consensus]. They assert that section 402A failed,
however, to confront the question of whether strict liability should be applied to the modern form of
design defect litigation, which requires consideration of whether a marginally safer product should
have been produced by changing its design in some fashion. See id. at 879-80.
36
Prosser, supra note 35, at 1103-10.
37
See Keeton, supra note 25, at 859.
38
Priest, supra note 6, at 2310-11.
39
Id. at 2311.
40
See id.
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cosmetics, alcohol, and cigarettes for which Keeton allowed that it “may
be sound social policy”41 to extend the implied warranty to those who are
injured in using the product as a matter of loss distribution.42 Thus, the
founder who most deeply considered the standard for defectiveness
contemplated extending strict liability beyond manufacturing defects,
even if not in such terms nor in terms of modern-day design defects.43
Keeton was not alone. In his article on liability for design
defects, Dix Noel briefly considered the notion of applying the emerging
strict liability standard for foodstuffs to durable goods.44 Priest writes of
Noel’s work that he “presumed that the negligence standard was the most
appropriate way of considering the design issue.”45 Yet, Noel’s 1962
article in the Yale Law Journal was descriptive, not normative, and so, of
course, would explain liability for design in terms of negligence, the
applicable standard at the time. At the conclusion of his article, Noel
addresses strict liability for design defects.46 Priest finds this discussion
to be dismissive of the idea: Noel is “incredulous” that a jet plane whose
wing is torn off despite the best efforts of the manufacturer could be
defectively designed; he “sarcastically” asks about the strict liability of
cigarette manufacturers who produced cigarettes at a time no one knew
of their dangers and is “incredulous” about the possibility.47
I do not read Noel in any such way. His discussion is
predominantly inquisitorial rather than normative. In referring to
cigarettes and state of the art jet airplanes, Noel sought to focus on the
issues that would have to be confronted if strict liability were employed
to address how safely products should be designed. In lawyerly fashion,
Noel tested the limits that would have to be addressed if strict liability
for design were employed. Far from being aghast at the possibility of
41
42

Keeton, supra note 25, at 872.
Keeton wrote:

If the warranty does extend to each particular user that he will suffer no injury, then the
position in essence seems to be that the many who benefit from the use of cigarettes,
whiskey, cosmetics, and drugs are paying for the tragic injuries to the few. This may be
sound social policy if it be assumed that the industry will be able to do this without
impairing the normal incentive to bring out new products and without serious effect on
the economic well-being of an industry that is important to the economy and to society.
Whiskey, cigarettes, and cosmetics seem to be indistinguishable from the standpoint of
what the courts should do. On the other hand, drugs and medicines may well be put in a
different category.
Id.

43

Even Keeton’s first category was not exclusively limited to products that did not
conform with the manufacturer’s intentions. Priest quotes Keeton, “[I]n this situation the product
was different from products of like kind,” but omits the first word of the sentence. Priest, supra note
6, at 2310 (quoting Keeton, supra note 25, 859) (internal quotation marks omitted). That word is
“generally.” Keeton, supra note 25, at 859. Nowhere in the remainder of his article does Keeton
explain the reason for the “generally” qualification.
44
Noel, supra note 29, at 877.
45
Priest, supra note 6, at 2312.
46
Noel, supra note 29, at 877.
47
Priest, supra note 6, at 2312.
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liability in that situation, Noel identified the conflicting tensions:
“Perhaps liability even in this situation would be a useful means of
spreading the loss; but that holding might unduly discourage the
development of useful new products.”48 While Noel was cautious about
the matter of strict liability for design, I do not read him as shrinking
from the prospect but rather as identifying the issues that would have to
be confronted if strict liability were so extended.
Priest cites two other articles by Noel.49 Priest finds in them
Noel’s “insist[ence] on negligence as the appropriate standard for designrelated injuries.”50 One of those articles reflects a presentation for
lawyers sponsored by the Practising Law Institute and does not have a
normative bone in its body.51 Far from stating his views on the proper
role for strict liability, Noel took on the task of educating his audience on
the expansion of negligence-based claims to product manufacturers.
Much of the content was drawn from the second publication, also
stemming from a presentation to lawyers, at an event sponsored by the
Southwestern Legal Foundation.52 That article is a rehash of the Yale Law
Journal article he had previously written and again has only descriptive
goals. Noel presented the cases in which negligence had been applied to
product design, after observing that while strict liability is the more
spectacular development, the expansion of negligence in its application
to products liability is worthy of attention in its own right.53 Nowhere in
either of these articles can one find an expression of Noel’s views about
strict liability being applied to design defects, Priest’s claims
notwithstanding.
Priest’s treatment of Fleming James’s work is no more
illuminating of James’s views than Priest’s characterization of Noel’s.
Priest writes that James’s two-part article on products liability limited
treatment of design defects to negligence.54 Yes, in a 1955 survey of
products liability, James, in Part I, which was devoted to negligence
liability, discussed manufacturers’ liability for negligent design.55 No, he
did not say anything there about strict liability for design defects, but
then he did not say anything about strict liability for any kind of defect
48

Noel, supra note 29, at 877.
Priest, supra note 6, at 2313.
50
Id.
51
Dix Noel, Manufacturers’ Liability for Negligence, 33 TENN. L. REV. 444 (1966).
52
Dix Noel, Recent Trends in Manufacturers’ Negligence as to Design, Instructions or
Warnings, 19 SW. L.J. 43 (1965). The presentation that Noel made was at what was designated a
“Symposium,” at which at least three other academics spoke. Yet, based both on the content of the
papers presented and the organization sponsoring the “Symposium,” this event was a continuing
education program for lawyers rather than an academic event. The Southwestern Legal Foundation,
a predecessor to the Center for American and International Law, had a mission of educating
domestic and international lawyers.
53
Id. at 56-60.
54
Priest, supra note 6, at 2311.
55
See generally James, supra note 28.
49
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because that Part was about negligence liability. Yet in Part II, which
addresses manufacturers’ liability in implied warranty, James did
consider strict liability. While he wrote that the standards for liability in
implied warranty and negligence were “[b]y and large” the same,56 he
was, consistent with his survey mission, attempting to describe the state
of the law rather than his views. And although he did not explicitly
address liability for design defects under implied warranty, James did
cite cases in which the basis for the alleged defect was not a
manufacturing defect.57 For example, when discussing a case in which
the risk posed by a chemical—its air dispersal qualities, which were
unknown—was not a manufacturing defect, James did not shrink from
imposing liability:
This would mean that when unexpected dangers develop from the use of a
valuable new product, the industry producing it (and so, ultimately, all the
beneficiaries of the product) would have to compensate the innocent victims of
those dangers. This is a far better solution than the alternative of making each
individual victim contribute the whole of his loss to this advancement of the
arts . . . .58

Thus, James reflects his longstanding preference for
redistributing personal injury losses, here through the mechanism of
strict liability for a (non-manufacturing) defect.
A passage in a 1957 publication contains an even more
illuminating example of James’s normative views about the proper scope
of strict liability. In a presentation at an Association of American Law
Schools program, James advocated strict liability for all products that
were unreasonably dangerous at the time of sale.59 Although others were
not as sweeping in endorsing strict liability as James, they also
contemplated its application in cases beyond pure manufacturing defects.
I do not understand how Priest could characterize Roger Traynor
as believing that strict liability was limited to manufacturing defects
based on Traynor’s 1965 article, The Ways and Meanings of Defective
Products and Strict Liability.60 As Priest states, Traynor does suggest that
a “deviation from the norm standard” may be overbroad in the case of
unavoidably unsafe products, such as blood contaminated with the
hepatitis virus.61 Yet, in the same discussion, Traynor suggests that some
56

Fleming James, Jr., Products Liability (pt. 2), 34 TEX. L. REV. 192, 206 (1955).
Id. at 213-15, 221-23.
58
Id.
59
Fleming James, Jr., General Products—Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without
Negligence?, 24 TENN. L. REV. 923, 923 (1957). Priest does cite this article in a footnote in a
different and later section of his article, acknowledging that James would include design defects in
his strict liability scheme. Priest, supra note 6, at 2321 n.77. That contrasts with his earlier statement
that James’ 1955 survey “discussed design questions solely in terms of negligence.” Id. at 2311.
60
Priest, supra note 6, at 2314. Traynor’s article is Roger J. Traynor, The Ways and
Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965).
61
Priest, supra note 6, at 2314 (citing Traynor, supra note 60, at 367-68) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
57
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drugs “of uniform quality” are defective under section 402A if their risks
outweigh their benefits.62 This is strict liability for design defects writ
large—the entire product fails a cost-benefit test.63 Traynor does little to
disguise his approval for such a result, although he was a member of the
Supreme Court of California at the time. Even Traynor’s concept of
deviation from the norm is subtly different from manufacturing defects,
for which the basis of comparison is the same product as intended by the
manufacturer. Traynor envisions that the deviation could be from similar
products made by other manufacturers.64 Such a test would include
defects that we understand today as design defects, although Priest fails
to recognize or acknowledge this.65 Going beyond deviation from the
norm, Traynor proffers the idea that products can be defective because
their danger is a surprise.66 Thus, Traynor expresses sympathy for strict
liability for products like cigarettes at a time before their dangers were
understood.67
John Wade’s views on defective design are illuminating for a
number of reasons. First, his thoughts in a 1965 paper belie Priest’s claim
that none of the founders were thinking about strict liability for design
defects. On the contrary, Wade observed that while manufacturing
defects could readily be determined, the “more difficult problem[s]”
were with dangerous products that were “made in the way . . .
intended . . . and in the condition planned,”68 namely design defects.
Wade suggests that the standard should focus on the dangerousness of
the product and whether it is “not reasonably safe.”69 At the same time,
given the familiar negligence “reasonable-person” standard, Wade claims
that his product-focused standard can be converted to a conduct-based
rule by asking if the manufacturer would have acted reasonably by
putting the product on the market.70 Priest rightly quotes Wade’s
comment that this rule “is simply a test of negligence.”71 What Priest
62

Traynor, supra note 60, at 368-69.
One might, I suppose, claim that this is nothing more than a negligence standard
applied to the product overall, but no one had thought that negligence might be so employed prior to
and even in the aftermath of section 402A. The idea of categorical liability for a product whose
dangers exceed its benefits was borne of the adoption of strict products liability.
64
See Traynor, supra note 60, at 367. That Traynor was thinking about the design of
similar products by other manufacturers is revealed in his comparison of the challenged product to
“the average quality of like products.” Id. Thus, Priest ignores this nuance in claiming that Traynor
describes Greenman as a manufacturing defect case.
65
Priest asserts that “Traynor clearly has manufacturing defects in mind” in this
explanation of defects. Priest, supra note 6, at 2314.
66
Traynor, supra note 60, at 370.
67
Id. at 370-71, 374 (discussing aspirin’s defectiveness before its risks were understood).
68
John W. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 SW. L.J. 5, 14 (1965).
69
Id. at 15.
70
Id.
71
Id. Wade was one of the stalwarts opposed to the use of consumer expectations
because he was concerned that in many cases there would not be any relevant expectations by which
to determine defectiveness as well as by the test’s treatment of latent dangers. See John W. Wade,
On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825, 829 (1973); see also Richard
63
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omits is that Wade had a clear idea of how his test was different from
negligence, as immediately after the acknowledgment quoted above,
Wade states: “In strict liability, except for the element of defendant’s
scienter, the test is the same as that for negligence.”72 In other words,
rather than proving the foreseeability of risk, Wade developed his
famous imputation-of-knowledge standard for strict products liability.73
The issue was whether a manufacturer who knew of the dangerous
condition in the product would put it on the market, thereby eliminating
the matter of foreseeability, a central concept in negligence claims.
Wade’s foreseeability-free standard for design defectiveness is, thus, not
the same as negligence, as we dramatically discovered when products
whose risks were unknowable at the time of manufacture appeared frontand-center on the products liability stage.
Wade reiterated his views eight years later in an article published
in the Mississippi Law Review in 1973,74 which is probably the “single
most influential” article on how courts understand strict products liability
and give content to the defectiveness concept.75 In that article, he
articulated a seven factor test for strict products liability.76 This test,
which was not limited to any specific kind of defect, largely reflected
risk-utility concerns that courts have relied on since. Responding to the
anticipated criticism that his seven factors were simply a negligence test,
Wade argued that this was much like the strict liability of negligence per
se in that the fault of the defendant was irrelevant and concluded that
L. Cupp, Jr., Defining the Boundaries of “Alternative Design” Under the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: The Nature and Role of Substitute Products in Design Defect Analysis, 63 TENN. L. REV. 329,
340 (1996).
72
Wade, supra note 68, at 15.
73
Whether Wade truly meant that knowledge of the danger would be imputed when the
danger was unknowable arose later when courts confronted that question in a variety of toxic
substances litigation. See, e.g., Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 376 (N.J. 1984); Beshada v.
Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 542 (N.J. 1982). Ultimately, he retreated from the
strongest imputation position. See John W. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge
Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734, 764 (1983).
74
Wade, supra note 71.
75

The article in which Wade advocated a risk-benefit standard by which to judge design
defects has been described by others as “‘[t]he single most influential piece of guiding
scholarship’ in the period . . . when [product defect] was being defined and expanded.”
LOUIS R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1.02 n.26 (2008)
(quoting, in part, David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33
VAND. L. REV. 681, 682 (1980)).
Green, supra note 12, at 614 n.29; see also Richard A. Epstein, Intuition, Custom, and Protocol:
How to Make Sound Decisions with Limited Knowledge, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 1, 25 (2006)
(stating that the Wade factors have “exerted immense influence over judicial decisions”); Kysar,
supra note 8, at 1712 (calling Wade’s article “highly influential”); Rabin, supra note 8, at 206 n.45
(describing Wade’s test as “widely noted”); Jane Stapleton, Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability, an Anglo-Australian Perspective, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 363, 395 n.117 (2000) (calling
Wade’s article “influential”); W. Kip Viscusi, Wading Through the Muddle of Risk-Utility Analysis,
39 AM. U. L. REV. 573, 578 (1990) (stating that “Wade’s seven factors have played . . . a dominant
role in the liability literature”).
76
Wade, supra note 71, at 837-38.
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courts should be honest about what they were doing: “If by doing this it
is really establishing strict liability, we might as well call it that and be
accurate.”77
I had previously been critical of that test as a test for a design
defect, not because it was or was not about strict liability, but because it
fails to recognize the appropriate factors for a risk-benefit test for design
defects. That criticism, however, stemmed from my failure to appreciate
the founders’ conception of a defect—because I was so imbued with the
modern model of three distinct bases for defect. Now, with a better
understanding of the founders’ conception, Wade’s factors make far
more sense. Let me explain.
My criticism of Wade’s factors was that they failed to recognize
the trade-offs inherent in designing a product and the necessity to
address, at the margin, the benefits and risks of any change.78 This is the
contemporary understanding of a design defect that involves a design
that can be changed in some way to provide greater safety. Rather,
Wade’s factors focus on the characteristics of the product itself, its social
utility and dangers, instead of honing in on the risks that can be
eliminated by changing the product’s design and the costs of doing so.
Thus, I had claimed that social utility—Wade’s first factor—of, say, an
AIDS vaccine—is irrelevant to the matter of its defective design:
[I]magine that we have identified a one hundred percent effective vaccine for
AIDS. Suppose the vaccine causes a mild auto-immune reaction—a rash that
lasts for a week—in one out of a million persons who take the vaccine. The
side effect can be eliminated by changing one of the inert ingredients with
77

Id. at 835. To be fair, within a page, Wade concedes that the evidence sufficient to
prove a design defect would also be sufficient to prove negligence in the design of the products and
that the only basis on which strict products liability differs from negligence is with regard to
manufacturing defects. See id. at 836.
78
Those factors are:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product—its utility to the user and to the public
as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product—the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the
probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and not be as
unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer’s ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without
impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user’s ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product.
(6) The user’s anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their
avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the
product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the
price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Wade, supra note 71, at 837-38; see also Wade, supra note 68, at 17 (providing a similar list of
factors to be employed in a risk-benefit balancing but that omit the loss-spreading criterion).
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which the vaccine is coated to another inert ingredient, no more expensive and
equally adept at serving its purpose. The vaccine is defectively designed despite
its enormous social utility. Risk-benefit analysis operates at the margin—the
utility of the existing design compared to the alternative—not at the level of the
entire product.79

I still think that is correct, but I now appreciate Wade and the
other founders’ perspectives.80 They were not thinking about marginal
design changes in a product. Rather, their conception of strict liability
was based on products whose risks in the course of the ordinary use of
the product were so serious that liability was legitimately imposed on the
manufacturer. This is much more like the standard imposed by implied
warranty, which although under-theorized in the context of products
causing physical harm, relies on the idea that a product should not cause
unexpected serious harm in normal use or utterly fail in its essential
purpose, causing physical injury.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. AndersonWeber, Inc.81 illustrates this conception of defect. It is not only
instructive, but exemplifies the kinds of cases in which implied warranty
was employed to impose strict liability. A car that was ten days old and
had been driven 300 miles caught fire while being driven, allegedly as
the result of a short circuit in the electrical system.82 The plaintiff relied
on implied warranty and, after surveying cases from New Jersey and
Tennessee in which brakes and steering failed in new cars, the court
proclaimed: “Brakes should not be defective from the beginning.
Steering mechanism should not fail, nor cars burn up within 10 days.
When such things happen and there is evidence as to the cause, courts
should be reluctant to deny the purchaser the right to submit his claim to
a jury.”83 Beyond State Farm, there are a multitude of cases prior to the
Restatement (Second) and dating back at least to the early part of the
twentieth century in which courts recognized the use of an implied
warranty theory for a product that failed to perform safely in its intended
use. Those courts exhibited indifference to the source of the defect; in
many of them it is difficult to determine from the court’s description of
the facts whether the source of the defect was one of design or
manufacture. The issue was whether the product performed with
adequate safety—in most of the reported cases, the products failed
abysmally.84
79

Green, supra note 75, at 619.
Professor Priest similarly misunderstood Wade and his test for strict liability,
criticizing it for failing to appreciate the need for an alternative design by which to frame the riskutility analysis. See Priest, supra note 6, at 2325-26.
81
110 N.W.2d 449 (Iowa 1961).
82
Id. at 452.
83
Id. at 456. The court was concerned with proof of the fire’s cause because the
defendant presented a theory that the fire was caused by events unrelated to a defect in the car. Id.
84
See, e.g., Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78, 81 (D. Haw. 1961) (hula skirt that
burst into flames and burned 75% of plaintiff’s body); McBurnette v. Playground Equip. Corp., 137
80

824

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:3

In summary, the academics interested in products liability in the
run-up to section 402A were most concerned with the contractual
impediments to liability that they sought to sweep away. Priest is right
about that. There was less attention to the standard of liability that any
strict liability theory might impose. Generally, the focus was on the
extent of danger posed by the product and when it exceeded some
threshold—”unreasonable,” for instance, or “extrahazardous”—a defect
(whether in negligence or warranty) existed that would subject the seller
to liability. Although courts were confronted with design defect cases
and at least some academics were writing about them, the source of the
defect—whether manufacturing, informational, or design—was not a
significant concern, regardless of the theory of liability being asserted.85
Thus, Priest’s thesis, which relies on a clear dichotomy between
manufacturing defect and design defect cases, does not fit well with the
evidence that exists. And because the focus was on the dangerousness of
the product, the founders, by and large, did not address the question of
how to apply this new strict products liability to a claim that a product
should have employed an alternative and marginally safer design.86
This appreciation for the early conception of defect explains why
the California Supreme Court, in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,87 felt no
need to elaborate about what constituted a defect, even if the defect may
have stemmed from the product’s design. In Cronin, bread trays secured
in racks in the back of a truck came loose in an accident and due to
sudden deceleration of the truck were driven forward, struck the
plaintiff-driver, and propelled him through the windshield.88 The trays
were released because the safety hasp designed to hold the trays in place
was defective.89 In the course of holding that a jury should not be
So. 2d 563, 564 (Fla. 1962) (sharp piece on playground equipment amputated three-year-old’s
finger); McCabe v. L. K. Liggett Drug Co., 112 N.E.2d 254, 257 (Mass. 1953) (coffee maker
exploded in plaintiff’s face); Bruns v. Jordan Marsh Co., 26 N.E.2d 368, 373 (Mass. 1940) (heel
separated from plaintiff’s shoe as she descended staircase); Souden v. Fore River Shipbuilding Co.,
112 N.E. 82, 84 (Mass. 1916) (“The fact that the explosion occurred while the boiler was subject to
the use for which it was designed is of itself evidence of a defective condition.”); DiVello v. Gardner
Mach. Co., 102 N.E.2d 289, 293 (Ohio C.P. 1951) (grinder disintegrated in hands of Plaintiff during
normal use).
85
See, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 33 Cal. Rptr. 175, 180-81 (Ct. App. 1963)
(braking system permitted inadvertent activation of brakes), rev’d in part, 391 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1964);
Mathews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So. 2d 299, 300-01 (Fla. 1956) (rocking lounge-chair had piece
underneath armrest that amputated portion of user’s finger); see also David G. Owen, The Puzzle of
Comment j, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1377, 1378 (2004).
86
My reading of the negligent design cases of the day is that they did not employ a
rigorous risk-utility test to claims that a safer alternative design should have been employed. Courts
took a host of avenues that short-circuited such claims rather than permitting a jury determination.
See Noel, supra note 29, at 866-77.
87
501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972).
88
Id. at 1155.
89
The metal in the safety hasp was porous and pitted, suggesting a manufacturing defect.
Id. at 1156. Yet the court never described the case as one involving a manufacturing defect, and, in
the course of declining to distinguish between the two sources of defects, recognized that the safety
hasp defect could have been either a design or manufacturing defect, depending on what the
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instructed in terms of section 402A’s “unreasonably dangerous”
language, the Court stated that all the jury need decide and be instructed
about is whether a defect existed.90 No further elaboration of the concept
of a defect was required. That was true either for manufacturing or
design defects. But the reason the court could conclude that is because its
conception of defect was the same one on which the founders were
operating as well: Did the product fail to perform as would be expected?
Whether the source of this failure was design or manufacture was not
important.
The idea that defectiveness was based on the product containing
an unacceptable level of (latent)91 risk when used in its intended fashion,
regardless of the source of the risk, provides a better explanation of
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.92 than Priest’s treatment.
Greenman, of course, is the case in which Justice Traynor persuaded the
remainder of the California Supreme Court to adopt the strict products
liability for which he had advocated in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co.93 There were two defects alleged by the plaintiff in Greenman. One
was that inadequate set screws were employed to hold parts of a lathe
together, enabling stock on which the plaintiff was working to be thrown
from the machine, injuring him.94 The other was that there were better
ways of fastening the parts together than using set screws.95 Inadequate
set screws, of course, could stem either from a manufacturing defect or a
design defect and is thus ambiguous. But a better way to hold the
machine parts together could only be a design defect. Perhaps that is why
Justice Traynor, in his opinion, described the strict liability being
adopted as encompassing “a defect in design and manufacture.”96
Priest claims, as a result of Justice Traynor’s 1965 article, that
Greenman was a manufacturing defect case.97 Priest also asserts that
Traynor’s view was that section 402A was limited to manufacturing

manufacturer’s specifications for the metal were. Id. at 1163. The court quoted testimony of an
expert, which suggests that this was a manufacturing defect not a design defect. See id. at 1157 (“[I]t
was just a very, very bad piece of metal. Simply would not stand any force—reasonable forces at
all.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
90
See id. at 1157.
91
I employ the parenthetical here because it is plain that hidden danger was an important
component of these early conceptions of defectiveness, especially ones informed by implied
warranty. Yet that view was by no means unanimous and inroads on the “open and obvious” defense
began early in the strict products liability day. See, e.g., Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 467 P.2d 229,
234-35 (Cal. 1970).
92
377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
93
150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
94
Greenman, 377 P.2d at 899.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 901. Moreover, Greenman was understood as applying strict liability to
manufacturing defects and design defects. BAJI 218-A (currently BAJI 9.00), the strict-liability
approved instruction that was drafted to reflect Greenman, provides for liability for defects in the
manufacture or design of a product. Cal. Civil Jury Instructions § 9.00 (2008).
97
See Priest, supra note 6, at 2315, 2321-22 & n.79.
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defect cases.98 Priest concludes that the disjunction between Traynor’s
view and his description in Greenman of the lathe containing defects “in
design and manufacture” results from the failure of those like Traynor to
focus on design deficiencies as a source of defect.99 I do not disagree that
the founders had not thought deeply about the appropriate standard for a
design defect—as I explained above, Cronin is evidence that that was
true of at least one leading court. Yet, Priest infers that the intent was to
limit strict liability to manufacturing defects. I think a better inference
from the evidence is that at this stage in the strict products liability
reform, sorting out the source of the defect did not matter. Commercial
products implicitly are safe for the jobs for which they are intended, and
when they are not and cause harm to a consumer, strict liability should
ensue.100
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.101 is the other classic presection 402A strict liability case.102 Based on a theory of implied
warranty rather than strict tort, the New Jersey Supreme Court focused
on stripping away the impediments that most commentators had been
writing about, including privity and disclaimers. In Henningsen, an
almost brand-new car, with less than five-hundred miles on its odometer,
suddenly made a ninety degree turn and crashed into a wall.103
Henningsen appears clearly to involve a manufacturing defect. Yet there
is nothing explicit nor indeed any indication in the case that the court
thought its decision was so limited. At no point does the court use the
term “manufacturing defect.” In responding to the defendant’s claim that
there was insufficient proof of breach of the implied warranty, the court
revealed its conception of a defect by explaining that the circumstances
of the accident justified a finding of the “unsuitability for ordinary use”
of the product.104 In a case that was explicitly one about implied
warranty, upon which section 402A’s standard for strict liability was
based, the concern that emerges is the extent of danger of a product in
ordinary use, rather than a deviation from the norm established by other
products of the manufacturer in the same line.
98
99

omitted).

Id. at 2315.
Id. at 2315 n.60 (quoting Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901) (internal quotation marks

100

Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901.
161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
102
Professor Priest identifies Greenman and Henningsen as the two critical cases leading
to the advent of strict products liability. See Priest, supra note 20, at 507.
103
Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 75.
104
Id. at 98. The court wrote:
101

The facts, detailed above, show that on the day of the accident, ten days after delivery,
Mrs. Henningsen was driving in a normal fashion, on a smooth highway, when
unexpectedly the steering wheel and the front wheels of the car went into the bizarre
action described. Can it reasonably be said that the circumstances do not warrant an
inference of unsuitability for ordinary use against the manufacturer and the dealer?
Id.
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The Structure of Section 402A

Professor Priest’s structural argument proceeds quickly past the
black letter language of section 402A, acknowledges that the two most
salient comments are ambiguous about which kinds of defects are
included,105 finds supportive evidence in two other comments, and
ultimately relies on the numerous examples contained in the
comments.106 Of the fifty-four examples in which the fact or possibility
of a product defect is adverted to, Priest finds that thirty-seven involved
manufacturing defects, eleven were about unavoidably unsafe products
and therefore did not implicate a type of defect, and six were of uncertain
source as to the defect.107
However, before examining Professor Priest’s evidence, let us
tarry on the black letter of section 402A, which requires that a product be
in a “defective condition unreasonably dangerous” for strict liability to
be imposed.108 Early drafts of section 402A imposed strict liability when
food was in a “condition dangerous to the consumer.”109 Dean Prosser
explained the evolution of this language to the final “defective condition
unreasonably dangerous” language at the ALI annual meeting in 1961,
when a motion was made to delete the “defective condition” language. In
the ensuing debate, Prosser added that the original language, employing
“dangerous,” had been modified to add “defective condition” to ward off
concerns that what are now known as unavoidably unsafe products
would be subject to strict liability merely because they posed some
significant, yet irremediable, risk.110
105

Priest, supra note 6, at 2318.
Id. at 2319 (“The strongest evidence that the founders focused exclusively on strict
liability for manufacturing defects is that they did not present a single example in the Comments of
an alterative strict liability application.”).
107
Id. I do not find this enumeration of types of defects contained in the discussion in the
comments persuasive. First, the point of the discussion is not, contrary to Priest, to explain the “types
of cases to which the strict liability standard was meant to apply,” in the sense of the types of defects
to which section 402A applied. Id. Nothing in the commentary addresses the types of defects to
which section 402A “applied.” Second, many of the examples are of non-defective products, as in
comment h, which refers to a “bottled beverage knocked against a radiator to remove the cap,” food
to which too much salt has been added by the user, or over-consumption of candy by a child, or in
comment f, which uses the example of a neighbor who sells a jar of jam to explain who is in the
“business of selling,” as required by the black letter. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
cmts. f, h (1965). Counting those examples as suggesting that section 402A is limited to
manufacturing defects is silly. Third, there are, as Professor Priest acknowledges, several examples
in which the defect is of uncertain origin. Id. Fourth, Professor Priest’s count is at least modestly
padded in his favor. He counts a reference, in comment f, to the owner of an automobile who resells
it as reflecting a manufacturing defect, when the text is insufficient to draw any conclusion about the
source of the defect. Priest, supra note 6, at 2320. Finally, whatever slim evidence this provides is
overwhelmed by the other language and structure of section 402A discussed in the text.
108
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
109
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (Prelim. Draft No. 6, 1958).
110
The following colloquy took place:
106

DEAN PROSSER: Mr. Dickerson has stated an original point of view which I first
brought into the Council of The American Law Institute in connection with this section.
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Thus, the key operative language in section 402A is the word
“dangerous,” rather than the “defective condition” language, which
showed up only to address a narrow class of cases, such as knives, butter,
and whiskey, that have dangers built in that cannot be removed. That the
focus was on danger reveals that Prosser was focused not on the
condition or source of the risk in the product. Thus, section 402A’s
premise was that products that, in the ordinary course of their use, caused
harm to users because of the extent of danger they posed were subject to
strict liability. “Defective” might have been a reference to a deviation
from the norm meant by the manufacturer—a manufacturing defect—but
its inclusion later in the ALI process reveals that it had both a narrower
and more stylized purpose than adverting to manufacturing defects.
Moreover, the adoption of consumer expectations as the standard
for determining when a product was subject to strict liability reflects the
contract heritage of section 402A and the contribution of implied
warranty as the basis for strict liability. The parties’ intent and
expectations are a contract concept and displace fault as the basis for
determining the content of a contract and whether it was breached. And,
as suggested above, the implied warranty cases involving personal injury
are concerned with unexpected and unacceptable danger in a product,
“[F]ood in a condition unreasonably* dangerous to the consumer” was my language. The
Council then proceeded to raise the question of a number of products which, even though
not defective, are in fact dangerous to the consumer—whiskey, for example [laughter];
cigarettes, which cause lung cancer; various types of drugs which can be administered
with safety up to a point but may be dangerous if carried beyond that—and they raised
the question whether “unreasonably dangerous” was sufficient to protect the defendant
against possible liability in such cases.
Therefore, they suggested that there must be something wrong with the product itself, and hence the
word “defective” was put in; but the fact that the product is dangerous, or even unreasonably
dangerous to people who consume it is not enough. There has to be something wrong with the
product.
Now, I was rather indifferent to that. I thought “unreasonably dangerous,” on the other
hand, carried every meaning that was necessary, as Mr. Dickerson does; but I could see
the point, so I accepted the change. “Defective” was put in to head off liability on the part
of the seller of whiskey . . . .
...
PRESIDENT TWEED: The motion is to eliminate “defective” in the black letter . . . .
...
PRESIDENT TWEED: The noes seem to me to have it.
38 ALI Proceedings 86-89 (1961), reprinted in W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND
SAFETY: CASES AND MATERIALS 223-25 (2d ed. 1989). Prosser’s statement that the “unreasonably”
language was in his original draft is incorrect. The first draft, in 1958, subjected food “in a condition
dangerous to the consumer” to strict liability. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (Prelim.
Draft No. 6, 1958). “Dangerous” was first modified with “unreasonably” at the same time as
“defective condition” was added and contained in the Tentative Draft that was the subject of the
discussion set out above. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1961).
Richard Wright thus gets it backward in his claim that the “unreasonably dangerous” language was
included to address unavoidably unsafe products. Wright, supra note 8, at 1069.
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regardless of whether it stems from a manufacturing, design, or
informational deficiency.
If strict liability were limited to manufacturing defects, there
would have been no need for consumer expectations to be employed in
section 402A. Manufacturing defects can readily be determined by
reference to other identical products and whether the questioned product
deviated from all of those others. If so, it is subject to strict liability. That
is precisely the way in which the Restatement (Third) imposes strict
liability for manufacturing defects, eschewing any reference to consumer
expectations in the definition or description of a manufacturing defect.111
Consumer expectations are a warranty and product-performance
standard, not a standard designed to assess a specific kind of defect.
Aspects of the commentary to section 402A beyond the black
letter and consumer-expectations standard for determining defect also
contradict the idea that manufacturing defects were the exclusive subject
for strict liability. Comment k, addressing unavoidably unsafe products,
belies that section 402A was limited to manufacturing defects. If it were,
there would have been no need for comment k to address unavoidably
unsafe products—those products are by definition ones in which the
danger exists in all such products as an inherent quality of the product.112
The same is true of comment j, which covers the requirement of warning
for products such as those in comment k that pose generic dangers to
users.113 Comment k also reveals that the American Law Institute had no
difficulty communicating that a class of products posing danger were not
subject to section 402A’s strict liability.114 Yet, there is no comparable
comment excluding design or informational inadequacies from the strict
liability of section 402A.115
111

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(a) (1998); see also Page Keeton,
Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY’S L.J. 30, 38-39 (1973) (observing that
“virtually any fabrication or construction defect” would be “unreasonably dangerous as a matter of
law”).
112
Professor Priest does not address comment k in his structural analysis of section 402A.
Priest, supra note 6, at 2317-24. He does, however, state at the outset that there are several passages
“susceptible to more expansive interpretations of strict liability,” but none of the ones he
subsequently discusses includes the language in comment k. Id. at 2318; see also Schwartz, supra
note 8, at 947 n.185 (“If the Restatement had no intention of applying to design issues, there would
have been no need for comment k, on ‘unavoidably unsafe products.’”); Ellen Wertheimer,
Calabresi’s Razor: A Short Cut to Responsibility, 28 STETSON L. REV. 105, 116 n.35 (1998)
(“Finally, sections such as comments j and k, which deal with defects other than those in
manufacture, would have been unnecessary . . . .”).
113
Comment i, as well, speaks to everyday products and the universal risks that are posed
by their use in the course of explaining that they are not unreasonably dangerous. See Henderson &
Twerski, Achieving Consensus, supra note 35, at 879-80.
114
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
115
Priest makes the complementary point that the comments do not contain a “single
example . . . of an alternative [to manufacturing defects] strict liability application.” Priest, supra
note 6, at 2319. The reason is that, as already observed, Prosser and the other founders were not
thinking in terms of subcategorizing defects. The fact that, by Priest’s count, there are six examples
of product defects that were of uncertain source is additional evidence of the lack of attention to and
concern about the defects’ sources. Id.
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Professor Priest finds language in comment h supportive.
Comment h states that the defective condition of a product “may arise
not only from harmful ingredients, not characteristic of the product itself,
either as to presence or quantity, but also from foreign objects contained
in the product, from decay or deterioration before sale, or from the way
the product is prepared or packed.”116 This language, Priest explains, is
exemplary of different ways that a manufacturing defect may exist, with
only the possible exception of the “quantity” idea.117 That is true, but it is
also insignificant when one considers the source of this language. It first
appeared in the earliest Preliminary Draft of section 402A, which applied
only to food products.118 The source of defects in food surely was
classical manufacturing defects. But food is not “designed” in the way
that durable goods are, and so we would not have expected a strict
liability provision applicable only to food to advert to the way that a
product—say, a lawn chair that rocks—might be defective because a
metal piece, sharp as a guillotine blade, is underneath the arm rest and
slices off a user’s finger.119
Another indication that there was no conscious decision to limit
section 402A to manufacturing defects is that it contains references to the
necessity of providing warnings. Failure to provide these warnings, when
required, renders the seller subject to liability under section 402A. Thus,
section 402A suggests that informational inadequacies can, in
themselves, constitute a defective condition unreasonably dangerous.120
Comment j, titled “Directions or warning,” states flat out that “[i]n order
to prevent the product from being unreasonably dangerous, the seller
may be required to give directions or warning . . . .” To be sure, liability
for these informational inadequacies does not look very strict—there is
no mention of dispensing with the negligence requirement of
foreseeability, the context is often one in which the manufacturer would
have knowledge, and, in one instance, the warning obligation is
explicitly conditioned on seller anticipation of the danger. Professor
Priest only refers to comment j, calling it “peculiar” and dismissing it
because all of the examples it discusses involve unavoidably unsafe
products.121 Yes, but comment j is not about only unavoidably unsafe
products, and its first sentence, quoted above, is not qualified in that
respect. Comment k is about unavoidably unsafe products and has its
own reference to the requirement that that class of products be
accompanied with proper warnings.

116
117
118
119
120
121

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. h (1965).
Priest, supra note 6, at 2318.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (Prelim. Draft No. 6, 1958).
See Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So. 2d 299, 300 (Fla. 1956).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmts. h, j, & k (1965).
Priest, supra note 6, 2323.
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Professor Priest’s final argument based on structure stems from
the treatment of contributory negligence in comment n, which denies any
defense based on certain negligent conduct of the plaintiff.122 Professor
Priest finds this denial “peculiar” because from the perspective of the
modern law and economics movement, contributory negligence is an
important adjunct to obtaining the efficiency provided by strict liability
so that consumers have adequate incentives to avoid injuries for which
they are the cheaper cost avoiders.123 Yet, Priest reasons, if strict liability
under section 402A is limited to manufacturing defects, then there is
little need for consumer incentives since there is little that a consumer
can do to avoid harm from a latent manufacturing defect that is
unknown.124 Denying contributory negligence in section 402A, thus, can
be squared with economic efficiency.
That the law and economics movement developed well after
section 402A had been drafted, debated, and published125 goes
unappreciated and unmentioned by Professor Priest. That tort law might
not be cast purely in terms of economic efficiency, even after those ideas
moved from the academy to the courts, similarly escapes Professor
Priest’s argument. That, in fact, contributory negligence was not a
defense to other strict liability claims when section 402A was adopted
also goes unrecognized in Priest’s treatment.126 Finally, Professor Priest’s
claims about comment n ignore a critical flaw in the economics’ claim
for the need for contributory negligence to insure victim care.127

122

We need not tarry on the scope of conduct encompassed by comment n, which is not
as broad as the holdings in cases cited by Professor Priest, because the breadth of comment n is
unimportant to the issue raised by Priest’s treatment.
123
Priest, supra note 6, at 2322-23.
124
See id.
125
Richard Posner’s first crack at explaining the Hand test in terms of economic
efficiency was in 1972. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
The following year was his first treatment of strict liability. See Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A
Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1973). Calabresi’s The Cost of Accidents was published in 1970,
five years after section 402A. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).
126
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 515, 524 (1977) (paralleling comment n
denying a claim for unreasonable conduct but providing a defense based on knowingly and
unreasonably assuming the risk).
127
The flaw is that there are other, more powerful incentives for protection of self against
personal injury than liability incentives, predominantly the risk of pain, suffering, and even death.
See Gary T. Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE L.J. 697,
704-27 (1978) (explaining the non-financial incentives for taking care to avoid physical injury to
oneself). In 1986, in the third edition of his book, Judge Posner nodded in the direction of this
criticism, acknowledging that damages may not provide full compensation for personal injuries and
that potential victims may therefore have an unspecified “incentive” to take care even if tort law
does not sanction their unreasonable behavior. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
154 (3d ed. 1986). Similarly, Steve Shavell recognizes that if victims “would not or could not be
fully compensated for . . . serious personal injury or death,” they would “have an incentive to take
care” independent of tort law. STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 11 n.9
(1987).
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THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD)’S TREATMENT OF DESIGN
DEFECTS RECONSIDERED

I had not intended to spend so much of this paper attending to
Professor Priest’s manufacturing defect hypothesis. The more I read,
however, the more intriguing his claim and evidence became. The more I
explored, the more convinced I became that the founders and section
402A were concerned not about specific kinds of defects and their
amenability to strict liability, but about products that were excessively
dangerous. As I have attempted to show, the evidence in support of that
proposition is quite overwhelming, and there is almost nothing, upon
careful examination, supporting the idea that section 402A was meant to
be limited to manufacturing defects.
However, the fact that section 402A was not limited to design
defects does not mean, as stated earlier, that it adopted a consumer
expectations test for design defects, as others have suggested.128
Returning to where we began and where I found common ground with
Professor Priest, the founders, with their focus on products that
performed in an excessively dangerous manner, just were not thinking
about marginal safety improvements or that failure to employ an
alternative design might be the basis for strict liability. Nor did they
consider the propriety of consumer expectations in deciding such cases.
Almost a decade after section 402A was approved and after early real
design defect cases were emerging, John Wade remained concerned with
defects of the implied warranty variety—products that contained
excessive or unreasonable danger, regardless of the source of the
danger.129
Yet the difficulties of a consumer expectations test for designs at
the margin have been well documented. Once the strict products liability
movement got going after section 402A was published, cases that
presented the issue of “how safe is enough?” began emerging. And
courts began expressing concerns about the use of consumer expectations
when consumer expectations about the matter were indeterminate or nonexistent, leaving resolution of the matter of defect entirely to the
unencumbered judgment of the jury.130
Once again, the California experience is revealing. Six years
after Cronin, the California Supreme Court was confronted with a case,
128

See supra text accompanying notes 12-15. Bill Powers explains the difficulties and
waning influence of the consumer expectations test as more difficult design defect cases became a
staple of products liability litigation. See William Powers, Jr., A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict
Products Liability, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 639, 646, 653-54. Although he focuses more on complex
designs than on difficult determinations about whether the safety performance of the product was
deficient, his analysis and explanation of why courts have moved away from it is illuminating.
129
See supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
130
See, e.g., Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 435 P.2d 806, 807-09 (Or. 1967) (pickup truck
that had wheel come apart after hitting a rock five or six inches in diameter).
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Barker v. Lull Engineering Inc.,131 in which the plaintiff explicitly
asserted that a high-lift loader, used at a construction site, should have
had several improvements to its design to make it safer.132 The context
was not a routine construction-site environment, but one where the
loader would be used on sloping ground and was therefore more
susceptible to tipping.133 The plaintiff was injured when, in the course of
lifting a load of lumber, the loader tipped over.134 Reaffirming its
decision in Cronin that section 402A’s “unreasonably dangerous”
language should not be used in charging a jury on strict products
liability, the court nevertheless recognized the need for some guidance to
be provided to the jury on the matter of how safe a product need be
designed. The court provided a dual-disjunctive standard for determining
defectiveness in a design case.135 The first adopted the Greenman
performance-based consumer expectations standard.136 As the court
recognized, this standard for defectiveness will often be proved by
circumstantial evidence bearing on the accident that occurred, rather than
proof of the specific defect.137 The second test for defectiveness entailed
proof, based on a balancing of the risks of the existing design compared
to the greater safety of an alternative design with the utility or benefits of
the existing design compared to the alternative design.138
By 1994, however, the court appreciated the indeterminacy of
consumer expectations for marginal design defect claims. In Soule v.
General Motors Corp.,139 the plaintiff was hurt in an automobile accident
when the toepan beneath her feet was crushed rapidly backwards in the
collision.140 Among the defects alleged by plaintiff was the design of the
frame, which permitted the toepan to be rapidly deflected toward the
driver.141 But a collision with a closing speed between thirty and seventy
miles per hour just does not afford any basis for determining how well an
automobile should protect a driver against rapidly deflecting parts. The
circumstances of this accident just did not permit an inference of a defect
in the car. The court declared that consumer expectations, in this
131

573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
Plaintiff’s expert identified several improvements in the loader’s design whose
absence allegedly made it defective: (1) equipping it with outriggers so that it would be steadier,
especially on sloping ground; (2) providing a roll bar and seat belt for the operator; (3) improving
the leveling control provided for the operator; and (4) including a “park” position on the loader’s
transmission. Id. at 447-48.
133
Id. at 447.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 452.
136
Id. at 454.
137
Id. Yet it seemed to be inapplicable in Barker. The regular operator of the loader
called in sick on the day that plaintiff was injured because he thought the sloping ground and narrow
base of the loader were incompatible, creating a dangerous situation. Id. at 448 n.2.
138
Id. at 454-55.
139
882 P.2d 298 (Cal.1994).
140
Id. at 301.
141
Id. at 302.
132
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situation, could not be used to determine if the car was defective.142 Use
of consumer expectations had to be limited. Although the court’s
explanation referred to complex designs as being beyond the ken of a
jury,143 it was not the complexity of the automobile’s design that
presented the problem. Rather, it was that the performance of the
automobile, under the circumstances, was not such that an inference of
defect was possible.144 On the other hand, if the same automobile with the
same complexity of design exploded while idling at a traffic light, the
court acknowledged that consumer expectations would permit a finding
of defect.145 Thus, the court left difficult marginal design defect claims to
be resolved by the risk-benefit prong of Barker, while preserving
consumer expectations for the performance-based failure to provide a
floor of safety that all products should provide and that were, in my
assessment, the focus of section 402A.146
The Restatement (Third) reflects these lessons learned with the
emergence of marginal design defect claims and yet, in my judgment,
remains true to section 402A’s conception of defect, contrary to some
critics. In section 2(b), the Restatement provides a risk-utility standard
for design defects. This is a negligence standard, pure and simple, given
its requirement that the risks be foreseeable.147 At the same time, section
3 contains an alternative formulation for finding a defect—an alternative
that is roughly congruent with the “excessively dangerous” conception of
defect contained in section 402A.148 Although couched as the strict
liability analog to res ipsa loquitur and often referred to as the
“malfunction theory” of defect, this section encompasses the kinds of
cases that were the model for section 402A: a brand-new car that takes
an uncommanded right turn and crashes into an obstacle; a rocking
lounge chair that cuts off a user’s finger; or a power tool that fails
adequately to hold stock in place. Interestingly, two of these examples
appear as Illustrations to section 3 in the Restatement (Third), yet are
drawn from the facts of the two classic cases supporting section 402A.149
142

Id. at 301.
Id. at 308.
144
See Powers, supra note 128, at 646 (noting that “it is difficult to ascertain consumer
expectations in all but the simplest cases”).
145
Soule, 882 P.2d at 308 n.3.
146
Id. at 308-09.
147
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998). The balancing of risks
and benefits is obscured because it is not explicitly stated in the black letter of section 2(b).
Comment f clarifies the essential inquiry, a balancing of the safety benefits of the alternative design
with its costs and other disadvantages compared to the actual design.
148
Id. § 3 (1998). I do not want to overstate the equivalence of section 3 of the
Restatement (Third) and section 402’s concept of defect that I have explained in this Article. I have
not, at this point, thought through all of the issues that are implicated. We will also need more
opportunity to see how courts interpret and apply section 3 before a final judgment is appropriate.
149
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3 illus. 5, 7 (1998). That Illustration
7 does not result in liability does not diminish the point, as the reason for non-liability is that the
source of the defect was equally probably the result of someone other than the seller.
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To the Reporters’ credit, in the midst of their drafting and facing
heavy criticism over their adoption of a risk-utility test for design
defects, they modified section 3 in an important respect. In Council Draft
No. 1, the predecessor to section 3 provided that an inference could be
drawn when the circumstances were such that the malfunction “was
caused by a manufacturing defect.”150 This section remained limited to
manufacturing defects through Tentative Draft No. 1, but in subsequent
drafts and the final version was extended to design defects as well.151
Notably, one version of this section revealed its kinship with the
performance-based standard for dangerous product defects in section
402A by explaining that it was available when a product failed “to
function as a reasonable person would expect” and caused harm in a
manner justifying an inference that a defect was responsible.152 Although
discarding the warranty “consumer” from the consumer expectations test
and substituting the tort “reasonable person,” the relationship between
section 402A in the Restatement (Second) and section 3 in the
Restatement (Third) is plain.153
Just as section 402A was indifferent to the source of the defect,
section 3 is indifferent to whether the misperformance is due to design or
manufacturing. Indeed, I take it that, even if we know the source of the
defect, a plaintiff may rely on section 3 if the circumstances of the
accident justify the inference of defect contemplated by that section.
Thus, to return to Matthews v. Lawnlite Co.,154 the case in which a lounge
chair amputated the user’s finger, even if we knew that the source of the
defect was one of design, a plaintiff would be able to pursue a section 3
claim and would not be required to prove a reasonable alternative design
under section 2(b).155

150

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 102 (Council Draft No. 1, 1993).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3 (Tentative Draft No. 2,
1995); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3 (1998).
152
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994).
153
The final version of section 3 became the product liability analog of res ipsa loquitur,
eliminating any perspective and relying on the circumstances of the harm-causing incident for an
inference that a product defect, rather than some other cause, was responsible. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3 (1998).
154
88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956).
155
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3 cmt. b (1998). Comment b is
muddled in its treatment of this issue. It states that a plaintiff injured by a plane whose wings
suddenly fall off may know that it was due to design, but when the circumstances justify an
inference of defect under section 3, “it should not be necessary for the plaintiff to incur the cost of
proving whether the failure resulted from a manufacturing defect or from a defect in the design of
the product.” Id. But the issue in the plane crash case is not whether the plaintiff should incur the
cost of identifying the source of the defect; the issue is whether the plaintiff, when the source of the
defect is known to be one of design, is limited to section 2(b), the design defect standard. However,
comment b to section 2 of the Restatement (Third) makes clear that section 3 is an alternative
method of proving a design defect. See also Henderson & Twerski, Achieving Consensus, supra note
35, at 906 (“Inferences of defect based on product malfunction obviate the need to apply the general
design standard, thereby rendering that subset of design cases relatively easy to decide.”).
151
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This brings me to my conclusion: the Products Liability
Restatement does not contract the scope of liability for design defects
from that provided in section 402A. When section 402A was developed,
there already existed a negligent design cause of action.156 Section 402A,
without a great deal of consideration of the precise boundaries, added a
basis for liability for defects that made a product unreasonably
dangerous.
V.

CONCLUSION

Section 402A and the scholars and courts that crafted it were
concerned about easy cases in which products failed in performing at a
minimal level of safety. Impediments to establishing liability on an
implied warranty theory were the primary concern. Relevant also were
difficulties of proof of the elements of negligence, as negligence matured
into a broad-based theory that could be applied by injured purchasers,
users, and bystanders against those involved in the manufacture and sale
of a product. In this era, the type of defect was not important, and the
founders, although aware of the different ways in which a product might
be defective, paid little attention to the matter as section 402A was being
developed. Thus, I do not think that George Priest’s now twenty-year-old
claim that section 402A was intended to be limited to manufacturing
defects squares with the available evidence.
At the same time, the performance-oriented standard adopted
from the warranty of merchantability proved inadequate to address the
new kinds of cases that plaintiffs’ lawyers began bringing in the heady
early days of strict products liability. Cars that crashed were alleged to be
inadequately designed to provide adequate protection to the occupants.
Industrial machinery should have been provided with additional
safeguards to prevent momentary carelessness by an operator from
resulting in an amputation, even if the employer did not choose to
purchase such guards. Brakes and steering mechanisms on earth movers
should have been more effective, permitting the operator to manipulate
the machinery more nimbly.157 Consumer expectations, which could be
so readily employed in the classic cases of misperformance that led to the
adoption of strict products liability, proved inadequate to its task.
Confronted with the inevitably of tradeoffs in determining how safe a
product should be designed, a movement toward a risk-utility standard
began to take hold and was accelerated and confirmed by the
Restatement (Third) of Torts.
156

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 398 (1965). To be sure, that negligent
design cause of action did not require proof of an alternative design, which the Restatement (Third)
does. Yet, if the design defect is egregious enough (and I do not suspect that there are many products
in which this is the case), section 3 provides for liability without the need for proof of an alternative
design.
157
See, e.g., Garst v. Gen. Motors Corp. 484 P.2d 47, 62-63 (Kan. 1971).
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Yet in fashioning a risk-utility test for design defects while
adopting a separate provision for products whose misperformance is
sufficiently egregious for liability to be imposed, the Restatement (Third)
brings us very close to where we were when section 402A was adopted.
Section 3 of the Restatement (Third) imposes strict liability when a
product just does not meet minimum standards of safety, and the riskutility test of section 2(b) provides a negligent design standard to be
employed when the issue is how safe products must be designed. Critics
on both sides of the debate on strict liability and the Restatement
(Third)’s role have missed its essential role in this return to basics.

